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abstract: Sensory generalization influences animals’ responses to
novel stimuli. Because color forms a perceptual continuum, it is a
good subject for studying generalization. Moreover, because different
causes of variation in spectral signals, such as pigmentation, gloss,
and illumination, have differing behavioral significance, it may be
beneficial to have adaptable generalization. We report on generali-
zation by poultry chicks following differential training to rewarded
(T) and unrewarded (T) colors, in particular on the phenomenon
of peak shift, which leads to subjects preferring stimuli displaced
away from T. The first three experiments test effects of learning
either a fine or a coarse discrimination. In experiments 1 and 2, peak
shift occurs, but contrary to some predictions, the shift is smaller
after the animal learned a fine discrimination than after it learned
a coarse discrimination. Experiment 3 finds a similar effect for gen-
eralization on a color axis orthogonal to that separating T from T.
Experiment 4 shows that generalization is rapidly modified by ex-
perience. These results imply that the scale of a “perceptual ruler”
is set by experience. We show that the observations are consistent
with generalization following principles of Bayesian inference, which
forms a powerful framework for understanding this type of behavior.
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Responses to novel stimuli are likely to be based on sim-
ilarity to familiar stimuli, combined with knowledge about
how stimuli vary. This variation depends partly on the
objects of interest; oranges are edible over a smaller color
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range than apples. More fundamentally, variation is de-
pendent on the physics of the stimulus. Thus, the effect
of varying distance from a sound source depends on the
acoustic environment, while varying light environments
and shadowing distort colors in specific and predictable
ways. Handling these problems requires neural “models”
of variation, which can be compared to models used in
statistics. Ultimately, noise in receptors sets sensory thresh-
olds, so one can ask whether further limits are imposed
by subsequent neural processing (Geisler 1989; see Kelber
et al. 2003 regarding animal color vision). Whereas dis-
crimination thresholds and receptor noise are fairly easy
to define, it is more difficult to give an optimal model to
test hypotheses about processes such as generalization and
categorization. Bayesian models are increasingly used in
psychology and neuroscience to develop testable predic-
tions of optimal performance (Rao et al. 2002; Tenenbaum
and Griffiths 2001; Cheng 2002; Cheng and Spetch 2002).
Bayesian models have also been applied directly to color
perception (Brainard and Freeman 1997), but this work
has concerned how representations robust to illumination
changes can be optimally derived rather than how we gen-
eralize and categorize such stimuli. This article shows how
such models might inform our understanding of gener-
alization in color vision.
Peak shift. Peak shift is a well-established phenomenon
in animal and human (Thomas et al. 1991; Wills and
Mackintosh 1998; Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003) percep-
tion. After training to two stimuli, subjects give their stron-
gest responses not to the higher-value training stimulus
but to a novel stimulus that differs from the neutral (or
negatively valued) stimulus in the same way as the former
but to a greater extent (fig. 1). The expected outcome of
a response may be positive, for example, a food reward,
or negative, as with distasteful objects. One can imagine
that peak shift may apply not only to learned but also to
genetically acquired preferences, such as those involved in
mate choice. In evolutionary biology, peak shift is of in-
terest because of its potential relevance to the evolution
of “exaggerated” signals, such as those involved in mate
choice and warning coloration (Ryan 1990; Weary et al.
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Figure 1: Generalization curves following differential conditioning on a stimulus dimension X. Horizontal scale is specified as multiples of the
standard deviation (SD) of the generalization curve. The model follows Spence (1937) in assuming that where there is 11 known stimulus, the
overall generalization curve (gray line) is given by summing curves (black lines) for each known stimulus. Variants on this model that have been
applied to human and animal behavior all predict that peak shift should increase as the separation of I and I on X falls (McLaren and Mackintosh
2002; Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003). Here the plots are for separations of 0.5 (left) and 2 SD (right).
1993; Enquist and Arak 1998; Yachi and Higashi 1998;
Lynn et al. 2005). In particular, Enquist and coworkers
(Enquist and Johnstone 1997; Enquist and Arak 1998;
Ghirlanda and Enquist 1998, 1999) argue that peak shift
reflects a mechanistic constraint on perception that is per-
haps attributable to the neural network–like properties of
the brain (see also McLaren and Mackintosh 2002). A
principal aim of our study is to consider the possibility
that peak shift in birds is a consequence of generalization
behavior following principles of optimal inference. Others
have suggested that peak shift may be optimized according
to criteria proposed by decision theory (Thomas et al.
1991; Lynn et al. 2005) or Bayesian inference (Cheng
2002). As these papers point out, if perception is indeed
optimized for dealing with an uncertain world, it is in-
appropriate to make any inferences about neural mech-
anisms.
Previously, we have described how poultry chicks gen-
eralize after appetitive conditioning to either a single re-
warded color or two rewarded colors (Osorio et al. 1999a;
Baddeley et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2001). This work showed
that chicks remember color accurately and described how
they generalize over different types of color variation, such
as hue, saturation, and brightness. Here we investigate
differential conditioning and, in particular, the effects of
varying the similarity of rewarded (T) and unrewarded
(T) colors, which results in peak shift.
Modeling generalization and peak shift. To describe gen-
eralization on some dimension X, the predicted outcome
of responding to a novel stimulus xnovel can be represented
by a plot of response “strength” against stimulus value
(fig. 1). With one known stimulus x1, generalization curves
are typically centered on x1 and are approximately Gauss-
ian or exponential functions of the stimulus dimension
(Spence 1937; Shepard 1987; Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003).
Given such a setup, it could be that the width of the
generalization curves is dependent either on discrimina-
tion thresholds or on the predicted effects of suprathresh-
old stimulus differences.
If an animal is familiar with more than one stimulus,
how should the additional information be used? For two
stimuli x1 and x2 with profitabilities p1 and p2, one pos-
sibility is that the subject sums the separate generalization
curves for x1 and x2, weighted by p1 and p2 (fig. 1). Spence
(1937) proposed this type of model, and it remains influ-
ential in theoretical treatments (Pearce 1997; Ghirlanda
and Enquist 1998, 2003; Wills and Mackintosh 1998;
McLaren and Mackintosh 2002).
A prediction of summation models is that if the re-
spective profitabilities p1 and p2 of the two stimuli x1 and
x2 are of opposite sign, for example, , then thep p p1 2
stimulus giving the largest, or peak, response xmax will not
be x1 but will be displaced away from the less profitable
x2 (fig. 1). The magnitude of this peak shift should increase
as the separation between x1 and x2 decreases (Wills and
Mackintosh 1998; Ghirlanda and Enquist 1999, 2003).
Although the basic model is straightforward and the
existence of peak shift is well established, there are rela-
tively few experimental tests that compare possible models,
perhaps in part because of the absence of alternative hy-
potheses. An additional difficulty is that of defining the
perceptual continuum necessary to specify the form of
generalization curves. One possibility, used for humans
(Wills and Mackintosh 1998), is to make an artificial stim-
ulus dimension using discrete features. Here we use our
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Table 1: Cone excitations and color loci of stimuli used in
experiments 1–4 (fig. 2)
Experiment, color S M L D x y D
Experiment 1:
T .43 .61 .76 .66 .130 .007
1 .41 .66 .69 .66 .112 .051 .047
2 .43 .63 .72 .66 .115 .025 .023
3 .39 .55 .74 .62 .148 .007 .023
4 .38 .53 .76 .62 .161 .020 .041
Experiment 2:
T .23 .21 .55 .34 .229 .148
1 .20 .17 .62 .35 .300 .198 .087
2 .21 .19 .59 .34 .271 .173 .049
N1 .27 .26 .48 .33 .147 .093 .099
N2 .40 .33 .33 .33 .050 .030 .303
Experiment 3:
T .45 .62 .78 .68 .126 .002
1 .56 .6 .77 .67 .077 .028 .058
2 .51 .61 .77 .67 .097 .013 .033
3 .40 .67 .79 .71 .148 .033 .038
4 .35 .70 .80 .72 .172 .055 .070
N1 .47 .68 .73 .68 .098 .035 .043
N2 .43 .57 .84 .71 .158 .029 .044
Experiment 4:
T .38 .52 .64 .56 .122 .00
T .39 .54 .78 .63 .159 .02 .045
N .36 .56 .48 .51 .057 .082 .102
Note: Estimated quantal absorbances of chicken short-, medium-, and long-
wavelength-sensitive single cones (S, M, and L, respectively) and double cones
(D), relative to a barium sulfate standard. The illumination was filtered to
exclude wavelengths visible to the chicken’s UV cones. Here x and y are
chromaticity values derived from cone excitations according to equation (1),
and D is the Euclidean distance from T. For color differences along any
given axis in the (x, y) chromaticity space, discriminability is proportional to
distance. It is not possible to compare color discriminability on different axes
without taking account of the relative sensitivities of the three cone mecha-
nisms (Vorobyev and Osorio 1998).
knowledge of spectral coding and receptor spectral sen-
sitivities to specify a continuum in color space.
Previous studies of pigeons confirm that color peak shift
occurs in birds (Guttman and Kalish 1956; Hanson 1959;
Weiss and Weissman 1992). That work used the wave-
length spectrum as the stimulus parameter, which has dif-
ficulties that we discuss below. Hanson (1959) also looked
at the effects of varying stimulus separation. Subjects were
rewarded for pecking at a key lit by 550-nm light but not
one lit by a longer-wavelength light. In tests, the pigeons
were allowed to choose colors across the spectrum, and
they did indeed respond most strongly to wavelengths be-
low 550 nm. Also, reducing the spectral separation between
the rewarded and unrewarded wavelengths, from 40 to 5
nm, increased the magnitude of the peak shift, although,
as far as we can tell, the effect is not statistically significant.
Color spaces and stimulus design. For investigating high-
level sensory processes, such as generalization or catego-
rization, it is desirable to have a measure of the stimuli
that is independent of the process itself. In color vision,
one might use the wavelength spectrum (where stimuli
can be well defined), but discriminability (or perceptual
distance) is not simply proportional to wavelength differ-
ence, greatly complicating interpretation. Nor is it easy to
use monochromatic light in naturalistic conditions. A bet-
ter starting point is to use receptor excitations (table 1;
fig. 2; Osorio et al. 1999b). Noise in receptor signals ul-
timately limits performance (Geisler 1989; Cohn 2004),
and it is parsimonious to account for data in terms of a
relatively low-level process. For example, if two different
spectra give identical receptor signals (i.e., metameric col-
ors), they will inevitably elicit identical behavioral re-
sponses. More important, judgments of similarity can be
expected to scale with the magnitudes of differences in
receptor signals. Only when judgments do not follow pre-
dictions of a receptor model can we draw inferences about
(subsequent) neural processing.
It is relatively easy to estimate the expected receptor ex-
citations to measured spectra, and color discrimination
thresholds in birds and other animals are well predicted by
a model that assumes that discrimination is based on chro-
matic signals (i.e., excluding “brightness”), whose perfor-
mance is limited by photoreceptor noise (Vorobyev and
Osorio 1998). Goldsmith and Butler (2003, 2005) provide
experimental support and a useful discussion of this model
with reference to bird vision. For stimulus design, the ex-
periments reported here used the three-dimensional recep-
tor space defined by the outputs of the short-, medium-,
and long-wavelength-sensitive single cones (S, M, and L,
respectively; table 1; fig. 2). For practical reasons, the very-
short/UV-wavelength-sensitive cone was excluded by fil-
tering the illumination (Osorio et al. 1999b). We have no
reason to believe that inclusion of a UV signal would have
any effect on the substantive findings reported here. The
chromaticity coordinates (i.e., the approximate hue and
saturation but not brightness) of a color are represented
by the projection of its locus in the three-dimensional
receptor space onto a unit plane (fig. 2A), given by
xp (q  q )/ 2,l s
yp [q  0.5(q  q )]/ 3/2, (1)m l s
where qs, qm, and ql are, respectively, the estimated quan-
tum catches of the S, M, and L cones relative to a white
adapting background (table 1; Osorio et al. 1999b; Kelber
et al. 2003).
For colors of approximately equal intensity, a model of
discrimination thresholds (Vorobyev and Osorio 1998;
Kelber et al. 2003) makes the following useful predictions:
(1) in the (x, y) chromaticity space, the shortest distance
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Figure 2: Loci of stimuli used in a chromaticity diagram based on estimated responses of chicken short-, medium-, and long-wavelength-sensitive
cone photoreceptors (table 1). The x and y values are calculated from cone responses, as described in “Methods.” Color versions of similar plots
are shown in other publications (Osorio et al. 1999a, 1999b; Jones et al. 2001), and a color version of this figure is available in the online edition
of the American Naturalist. A, Chromaticity diagram. The equilateral triangle defines the region given by cone signals ≥0, and the gray line indicates
the locus of monochromatic lights, with crosses plotted at 10-nm intervals from 490 to 620 nm. The color names “green,” “red,” etc., are those we
(normally) give to spectra falling in that part of the chicken’s chromaticity diagram. The two boxes outline the areas of the diagram enlarged in
B–E. B, Loci of stimuli used in experiment 1. The plus sign indicates the rewarded training color, and 1–4 denote the other experimental colors
used as unrewarded training stimuli or novel stimuli in tests; see text for details. C, Loci of stimuli used in experiment 2. The plus sign indicates
the rewarded training color, 1 and 2 denote unrewarded training colors, and N1 and N2 denote novel colors used to test generalization. D, Loci of
stimuli used in experiment 3. The plus sign indicates the rewarded training color, 1–4 denote unrewarded training colors used in the four experimental
conditions, and N1 and N2 denote novel colors used to test generalization. E, Loci of stimuli used in experiment 4. T indicates the rewarded
training color, T indicates the unrewarded training color, and N indicates the novel color used in tests.
in “just noticeable difference” (jnd) steps (Wyszecki and
Stiles 1982) between two color loci is a straight line; (2)
two points separated by a given vector are separated by
an equal number of jnd steps; and (3) more generally, the
model predicts that any pair of colors separated by a given
vector are equally discriminable. This last prediction may
fail for large color differences but should hold for the fairly
similar colors used here (fig. 2; sec. 8.4 of Wyszecki and
Stiles 1982). Assuming that predictions 1–3 hold, we can
define the following terms for colors in the (x, y) space:
(1) An axis is a straight line; (2) color distance corresponds
to the separation of any two points along a given axis;1
and (3) if a vector a separates two colors, the vector a
is said to specify the opposite color difference.
This study is similar to Hanson’s (1959) in that birds
1 Comparison of color distances along separate axes in this cone space would
require assumptions about the relative sensitivities of different cone mecha-
nisms (Vorobyev and Osorio 1998). This is not needed here because we are
not comparing the magnitude of generalization on different directions in the
receptor space.
were trained to two colors, one of which (T) yielded a
food reward while the other (T) did not. Tests then re-
corded the effects of varying the similarity of T and T
on responses to novel colors. For experiments 1 and 2,
the novel colors lay on the same axis in color space as the
two training colors, and so these experiments measured
peak shift. For experiment 3, the novel colors lay on an
approximately perpendicular axis (fig. 2). Finally, experi-
ment 4 looked at what is learned in a first encounter with
a novel stimulus.
Methods
Training and Testing
Male poultry chicks (ISA-Brown) were kept, trained, and
tested in pairs. The experiments followed standard pro-
cedures (Osorio et al. 1999b; Jones et al. 2001). Starting
a week after hatching, chicks were trained in an arena
( ) for two 6-min sessions per day after 2 h0.4 m# 0.3 m
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of food deprivation. On the arena floor were eight conical
paper containers approximately 28 mm in length with a
17-mm base. Four containers of the rewarded color (T)
contained standard chicks crumbs, which were replenished
at 1-min intervals (i.e., five times per session); the other
four were of the unrewarded color (T) and were empty.
Chicks were trained six times over 3 days and tested on
the fourth day.
For experiments 1–3, chicks learned either a fine or a
coarse color discrimination (one in which the difference
between rewarded and unrewarded stimuli was large or
small). In each experiment, T was fixed and T varied
according to the treatment. For fine discrimination tasks,
T and T were more alike than in the comparable coarse
tasks (fig. 2; table 1). Although the chicks eventually made
the fine discrimination easily (figs. 3–5), there was a pos-
sibility that they would not initially notice the difference.
For this reason, the first three training sessions involved
a coarse discrimination, and the more difficult task was
used for the remaining four training sessions.
Tests were done after 2 h of food deprivation. In tests
for experiments 1–3, chicks spent 2 min in the training
arena with empty food containers. There was a choice of
four stimulus colors: T, T (fine), and two novel colors,
N1, N2 (fig. 2B–2D; table 1). Tests lasted 2 min and scored
the number of times each color was selected by the pair
of chicks. We disregarded repeated pecks at the same stim-
ulus or occasions where a chick copied its partner (Osorio
et al. 1999a, 1999b). Such copying is readily recognized
when one bird observes the other select a stimulus and
immediately attempts to take it, normally within a second.
The protocol for experiment 4 differed slightly from that
for experiments 1–3 and is described later.
Stimulus Design
As explained in the introduction to this article, colors were
specified by their locations in a receptor space based on
excitations of the chicken L, M, and S cones (table 1; fig.
2; Osorio et al. 1999b). Stimulus patterns were printed
onto the food containers with an Epson inkjet printer.
These patterns were tilings of -mm rectangles (see6# 2
Osorio et al. 1999a, 1999b) colored at random with either
the stimulus color or a background color (gray except in
experiment 3), in a ratio of 3 : 7. Chromaticities of the
colors were fixed, but their intensities varied at random,
with a uniform distribution and a contrast of 0.3 (Osorio
et al. 1999a, 1999b). Compared to a uniform color, these
tessellated patterns have two advantages: first, they prevent
chicks from using brightness rather than chromaticity, and
second, they may improve the accuracy of color recog-
nition by providing the background as a reference. The
floor and walls of the area were uniform gray of about
the same intensity as the stimuli themselves.
Statistics
For all experiments, one-tailed t-tests were used, either
between groups or within groups as appropriate. For ex-
periments 1–3, we used one-tailed tests because the di-
rection of shift was predictable. Tests compared the pref-
erences for the rewarded and novel colors. For experiments
1–3, the null hypothesis was that there was no effect of
the training condition on this preference. For experiment
4, the null hypothesis was that there was no difference
between the two tests.
Results
Experiment 1
This experiment tested how the similarity of rewarded and
unrewarded colors affected peak shift. The aim was to test
models, such as those of Spence (1937) and Ghirlanda and
Enquist (1999, 2003), that predict an increase in peak shift
as the separation of the two differentially rewarded stimuli
decreases. The experimental colors lay approximately on
a line in the chicken (x, y) color space (fig. 2A, 2B; table
1).
There were four treatment groups, in all of which the
rewarded color T was fixed (orange to the human eye;
fig. 2B; table 1), but each had a different T, named T1–
T4. For group 1, T1 was yellower than T; group 2 used
T2, which was also yellower but half the color distance
from T; groups 3 and 4 used T3 and T4, which were redder
than T and differed from it by approximately equal and
opposite color distances as T for groups 2 and 1, re-
spectively. In summary, groups 1 and 4 made coarse dis-
criminations, and groups 2 and 3 made fine discrimina-
tions. There were six pairs of chicks in each treatment.
After training over 4 days (see “Methods”), chicks were
left without food for 2 h and then given a 2-min test. This
scored the number of times each color was selected by the
pair of chicks with the following stimuli: groups 1 and 2
had T and T2–T4, while groups 3 and 4 had T and T1–
T3. Regardless of training conditions, the “fine” T was
used in tests, that is, T2 for groups 1 and 2 and T3 for
groups 3 and 4.
The results were as follows (fig. 3). First, the familiar
T was less attractive than the novel color (T2 or T3) that
differed equally from T ( , , ),tp 7.432 dfp 22 P ! .001
and second, there was no effect of the training condition,
fine or coarse, on the preference for T ( ,tp 0.212
, ). These observations showed that theredfp 21 Pp .417
was a peak shift away from T and also that the selectivity
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Figure 3: Results of experiment 1, which compared color generalization
of subjects trained to make coarse (dotted lines) or fine (solid lines)
discriminations. The rewarded color (T) was orange, and experimental
stimuli varied mainly in hue (fig. 2A, 2B; table 1). The plot shows the
mean number of of each color in a 2-min test versusselections SEM
the color distance from T. a, Top, data for subjects trained with “yel-
lower” T colors: 1 (dotted line) and 2 (solid line); bottom, data for subjects
trained with redder T colors: 4 (dotted line) and 3 (solid line). On these
plots, colors “redder” than T are assigned negative values, and “yellower”
colors are assigned positive values. b, Pooled data from a for subjects
trained to make either coarse (dotted line) or fine (solid line) discrimi-
nations. T is assigned a negative value relative to T, and the novel
colors are assigned positive values. Plotted color distances are the means
from the two sets of experimental treatments illustrated in a.
Figure 4: Results of experiment 2, which compared color generalization
of subjects trained to make coarse (dotted line) or fine (solid line) dis-
criminations. The rewarded color (T) was red, and unrewarded training
colors were more saturated and novel test colors less saturated than T
(fig. 2A, 2C; table 1). The plot shows the mean number of
of each color in a 2-min test versus the color distanceselections SEM
from T.
in the direction of T from T was unaffected by the
separation of the training colors, T and T. The key
observation was that the peak shift (i.e., the preference for
the novel colors) compared to T was smaller for groups
2 and 3, which had learned a fine discrimination, than for
those in groups 1 and 4, which had learned a coarse dis-
crimination ( , , ). In sum-tp 4.192 dfp 21 P ! .001
mary, the experiment showed a peak shift and that this
shift was smaller after learning a fine discrimination than
after learning a coarse discrimination (cf. fig. 1).
Because the results were not fully consistent with pre-
dictions of models of peak shift, we repeated the experi-
ment and obtained very similar results. (1) The novel col-
ors were preferred to the unrewarded color that differed
equally from T ( , , ). (2) Theretp 6.060 dfp 18 P ! .001
was no effect of the training condition on the preference
for the unrewarded color ( , ,tp 0.019 dfp 17 Pp
). (3) The preference for the novel colors compared.493
to T was lower for groups 2 and 3, which had learned a
fine discrimination, than for groups 1 and 4, which had
learned a coarse discrimination ( , ,tp 3.161 dfp 17
).Pp .002
Experiment 2
This experiment resembled experiment 1 but tested red-
dish colors (fig. 2C; table 1) that varied in saturation (i.e.,
difference from gray). Because a spontaneous preference
for more saturated colors might occur without training,
we tested peak shift toward gray. For group 1, the unre-
warded color T1 was more saturated than T; for group
2, T2 was also more saturated but half the color distance
from T. The novel colors lay on the same axis: N2 was
nearly achromatic, and N1 was intermediate between T
and N2. The background was not gray but yellow, so that
the chromatic contrast between all stimulus colors and the
background was approximately constant (fig. 2C). Group
1 was said to be making coarse and group 2 fine discrim-
inations. Subjects were trained and tested on the same
schedule as for experiment 1. The test colors were T, T2,
N1, and N2 (fig. 2C; table 1). There were 10 pairs of chicks
in each treatment.
The results resembled those for experiment 1 (fig. 4).
(1) The novel colors were preferred to T2 ( ,tp 7.252
, ), which is indicative of a peak shift. (2)dfp 17 P ! .001
The preference for the novel colors compared to T was
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Figure 5: Results of experiment 3, which compared color generalization of subjects trained to make coarse (dotted lines) or fine (solid lines)
discriminations on one axis in color space and tested generalization on a different axis (fig. 2A, 2D; table 1). The rewarded color (T) was orange.
The plot shows the mean number of of each color in a 2-min test versus the color distance from T. A, Top, data for subjectsselections SEM
trained with T colors 1 (dotted line) and 2 (solid line); bottom, data for subjects trained with T colors 4 (dotted line) and 3 (solid line). Histograms
show the responses of each group to T. The position of the bar represents the color distance from T. However, because T colors and novel
colors lie on different axes, their discriminabilities cannot be directly compared (see “Methods”). B, Histogram of pooled data for subjects trained
to coarse (white bars) or fine (black bars) discrimination tasks, comparing responses to T and novel colors.
lower for group 2, which had learned a fine discrimination,
than for group 1 ( , , ). Thus,tp 4.519 dfp 16 P ! .001
the effect of distance between T and T on peak shift
reported for experiment 1 applied for a peak shift toward
gray with a more highly saturated T.
Experiment 3
This experiment resembled experiments 1 and 2, but now
the training and test colors lay on different axes in color
space (fig. 2A, 2D; table 1). There were four experimental
groups, all of which were rewarded with the same T (fig.
2D). For groups 1 and 2, the unrewarded colors T1 and
T2 differed from T in the same direction, with T1 offering
a larger color difference than T2. For groups 3 and 4, the
unrewarded colors T3 and T4 were roughly equal and op-
posite color distances from T as colors 2 and 1, respec-
tively. Training and testing were on the same schedule as
for experiment 1. There were five or six pairs of chicks in
each treatment.
Tests used two novel colors N1, N2 that lay on a different
axis in the (x, y) color space from the training colors.
Colors N1 and N2 differed from T by equal and opposite
vectors (fig. 2D). Tests included colors T, T, N1, and N2.
Color T was the unrewarded training color for the group
in question.
In the generalization tests, the preference for T relative
to N1 and N2 was higher after learning a fine discrimination
than after learning a coarse discrimination (fig. 5). With
pooled data for the two coarse groups (1 and 4) and the
two fine groups (2 and 3; fig. 5B), the difference between
coarse and fine treatments was significant ( ,tp 3.362
, ).dfp 11 Pp .003
Experiment 4
Experiments 1 and 3 recorded initial preferences of the
chicks for novel colors. Experiment 4 dealt with the sta-
bility of color generalization by asking how this initial
exposure affects subsequent preferences. Chicks learned a
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Figure 6: Results of experiment 4, which tested how a brief exposure to
an unrewarded novel stimulus modified generalization. The plot shows
relative preference for T, T, and the novel color N (fig. 2E; table 1)
in two successive tests 1 h apart. Between test 1 (solid line) and test 2
(dashed line), there is a substantial decline in the preference for N relative
to T.
color discrimination task with a yellow T and a redder
T (fig. 2A, 2E; table 1). Tests used T, T, and a novel
color N. In the initial test, preferences were given by the
proportion of the first 10 pecks directed at each of the
three colors (fig. 6). Chicks were then left in the test arena
until they had selected both the rewarded and the novel
colors eight times. We ensured equal numbers of selections
simply by removing the relevant stimuli when they had
been selected eight times. This gave them equal experience
of the N and T in the unrewarded test condition. A second
test 1 h later scored the first 10 selections by the pair of
chicks.
In the initial test, there was a peak shift (fig. 6), with
N preferred to T ( , , ). In thetp 3.968 dfp 7 Pp .002
second, test this shift was much reduced; the preference
for N relative to T dropped significantly ( ,tp 2.931
, ). Because the chicks had equal experi-dfp 7 Pp .010
ence of N and T in the test condition (i.e., an average
of four unrewarded selections per subject), this showed
that they were able to modify generalization after a brief
exposure to the novel stimuli.
Discussion
Poultry chicks learn color quickly and accurately (Osorio
et al. 1999a), which makes them good subjects for studying
stimulus generalization. Experiments 1 and 2 show that
after differential training there was a peak shift, as reported
elsewhere for bird color vision (Hanson 1959; Weiss and
Weissman 1992). However, this shift was smaller after a
fine discrimination was learned than after a coarse dis-
crimination task (figs. 2–4). To our knowledge, the only
previous report of a comparable effect on peak shift is for
human judgments of visual angle (Thomas et al. 1991).
Experiment 3 did not test peak shift but instead tested the
effects of differential training on generalization along
roughly orthogonal axes in the receptor color space (figs.
2D, 5). The result was consistent with experiments 1 and
2 in that learning a fine discrimination gave a narrower
generalization curve. Finally, experiment 4 showed that
when tested “in extinction,” the relative preferences for
novel and previously rewarded colors are unstable. Chicks
modify stimulus preferences rapidly, without differential
rewards on novel and familiar stimuli. The implication is
that generalization is labile and is unlikely to be due to a
process analogous to blurring or filtering of receptor out-
puts (Spence 1937; Blough 1975); we return to this subject
in “Peak Shift within a Bayesian Framework.”
When Hanson (1959) trained pigeons to discriminate
monochromatic lights, he found that peak shift along the
optical spectrum increased as the separation of T and T
fell (see also Pearce 1997; Blough 2001; Ghirlanda and
Enquist 2003). Similar effects are reported on other stim-
ulus dimensions and from other species (Pearce 1997;
Wills and Mackintosh 1998; Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003).
The peak shifts observed in these studies are consistent
with Spence’s (1937) model for stimulus generalization on
a sensory continuum, which assumes that generalization
curves to separate stimuli are summed (fig. 1), and variants
on it (Ghirlanda and Enquist 1998, 1999, 2003; McLaren
and Mackintosh 2002). The findings reported here and
elsewhere (Jones et al. 2001) on color generalization do
not follow the predictions of these types of model, raising
two questions. First, why should empirical data differ be-
tween studies, and second, what does this say about un-
derlying mechanisms?
Hanson’s (1959) experiment on pigeons was rather sim-
ilar to experiments 1 and 2 but used monochromatic lights
with a minimum color difference of 5 nm. By comparison,
in experiment 1 the difference between T and T in the
coarse training condition was equivalent to about 1 nm
between the monochromatic lights in the 570–590-nm
range (fig. 2). Also, Hanson interspersed probe tests in the
sequence of training stimuli. This procedure is likely to
reveal mainly the steady state response for a given exper-
imental schedule. Experiments 1–3 tested only the initial
response, and as experiment 4 shows, responses to novel
stimuli are rapidly modified by experience. Finally, Hanson
did not know the spectral sensitivities of bird photore-
ceptors and instead used the optical spectrum as the stim-
ulus dimension on which to investigate generalization. Un-
fortunately, the spectral line need not equate to a line in
receptor space (e.g., fig. 2A). Thus, Hanson used 550 nm
as T and longer wavelengths as T, but 550 nm is at the
apex of the chicken cone space (and would also be so for
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pigeons), which means that the effects are not easy to
interpret as peak shifts. This illustrates the importance of
taking account of low-level perceptual mechanisms in in-
terpreting processes such as generalization and categori-
zation (Bennett et al. 1994; Wills and Mackintosh 1998;
Blough 2001). By starting with receptor signals (table 1;
Osorio et al. 1999b) and using relatively small stimulus
differences, the experiments reported here should mini-
mize distortions owing to errors in the mapping of physical
stimuli onto perceptual spaces.
What Kind of Model Is Required to Explain This
Kind of Phenomenon? Perceptual Rulers
Turning to models, a feature of Spence (1937) is the pro-
posal that if an animal is familiar with multiple stimuli,
it will have a separate generalization curve for each stim-
ulus (e.g., T and T; fig. 1). Preferences for novel stimuli
are predicted by the overlap between the T and T curves.
Such models cannot predict the effects observed in ex-
periments 1–3 if it is assumed (1) that stimulus general-
ization is done on a perceptual space that preserves the
topology of the sensory (color) space defined by receptor
signals (fig. 2A; table 1) and (2) that in this perceptual
space generalization curves have single peaks or troughs
located at the values of the familiar stimuli, for example,
T, T.
In fact, a much larger class of models cannot account
for the observed data. One way of understanding what
kind of models can and cannot account for this pattern
of data is in terms of the concept of a perceptual ruler.
This is a mechanism whose scale varies to match the cur-
rently relevant signal statistics. In most models of percep-
tion at threshold, the measurements are made relative to
the noise level: if a signal change is significantly larger than
the background noise, it will be detected; otherwise, it will
not. In this case, the perceptual ruler is determined by the
noise level, and, except for changes in test conditions
(caused, for example, by variation in illumination intensity
or background noise), this level will be fixed independent
of the stimuli. Any model where the ruler that is used to
measure stimuli is fixed cannot account for our data.
In contrast to more usual models of perception, if you
ask whether a dog is large or small, you may expect dif-
ferent answers if the last two concepts asked about were
“whale” and “elephant” than if they were “mouse” and
“flea.” In this case, it is clear that the perceptual scale is
determined by the other relevant categories. We believe
that only models that have this characteristic of a flexible
perceptual ruler can account for our pattern of data in
experiments 1–3 (see Newell 1998 for another visual task
that requires such an explanation).
A Bayesian Account of the Peak Shift
How then to provide a more formal model of these phe-
nomena? Rather than framing the results in terms of clas-
sical animal learning theory (although it may be possible
to do so), an alternative is to model phenomena as Bayes-
ian inference. An increasing body of work on perception
is Bayesian (Rao et al. 2002; Kersten and Yuille 2003). This
has become the predominant method in machine learning,
and neural networks are often viewed as implementing
Bayesian principles (Kinouchi and Caticha 1992). This is
not the first time that this probabilistic framework has
been used to understand phenomena traditionally dealt
with by learning theory (e.g., Dayan et al. 2000), but here
we show that it naturally predicts peak shift and related
phenomena (see also Cheng and Spetch 2002).
Modeling Generalization as Bayesian Inference
The Bayesian approach is based on three observations
(Jaynes and Bretthorst 2003). (1) Many problems are char-
acterized by uncertainty. While it is possible to deal with
the possible using logic, greater insight is gained by mod-
eling the plausible and probable. This is particularly true
of human and animal behavior, where uncertainty and
ambiguity are the rule. (2) Probability theory is the correct
basis for dealing with uncertainty. Any system of inference
that does not map to probabilistic inference will by ne-
cessity produce inconsistent inferences (Jaynes and Brett-
horst 2003). (3) Finally, on a practical level, many prob-
lems associated with uncertain inference deal with
mapping from some observed data to some inferred and
unobserved state of the world. These problems are often
difficult to even formalize. In contrast, if one knows the
unobserved state, then constructing models of the prob-
ability of the observed is often far simpler. Bayes’s rule is
simply a probabilistic identity that allows one to map from
—for example, the probability of X, given Y—to aP(XFY )
probability of the form . While in the abstract thisP(YFX)
may not seem useful, in practice it makes many compli-
cated problems tractable.
Formally, Bayes’s rule consists of the equation
. The first term isP(XFdata)p P(dataFX)P(X)/P(data)
known as the posterior, or the probability of X, given the
data, and is usually the term of interest. Here it is the
probability of a reward, given the observed stimulus color.
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation,
, is known as the likelihood function. This is theP(dataFX)
term that captures our intuitions about how the data were
generated. It is often convenient to think of asP(dataFX)
a generative model that maps between the unobserved
cause and the observed effect. The third term, P(X), is
known as the prior. For those unfamiliar with Bayesian
S36 The American Naturalist
statistics, this term causes concern, but in many practical
situations (such as the one to hand), it is irrelevant. In
contrast, the last term, P(data), which resembles a simple
normalization constant, often does much of the mathe-
matical work. This term, sometimes known as the partition
function (from statistical mechanics), implicitly requires
summation over all possible causes of the data because
. In our situation, where there′ ′P(data)p SP(dataFX )P(X )
can be only a few plausible causes, this term is simple to
evaluate, and we will show that it can account for the
observed peak shift.
Peak Shift within a Bayesian Framework
In this study, stimuli vary on a continuous dimension X,
and after a limited number of examples, the animal gen-
eralizes to the infinite number of possible alternative values
on this dimension. This requires a model that extrapolates
from single examples to predictions for a range of values.
The first step is to consider the possible inferences from
a single example x1 of the concept S. On the intuition that
similar stimuli are liable to have similar implications (such
as rewards), the predicted benefit of responding to a novel
stimulus xnovel can be represented by a generalization curve,
which plots response strength against stimulus value (fig.
1). With one example x1, these generalization curves are
typically centered on x1 and assumed to be Gaussian
(Spence 1937).
Viewing such curves simply as generalization curves is
informative, but a more useful interpretation is within the
general theory of inference under uncertainty. In this
Bayesian framework, following others (Shepard 1987;
Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2001), one very natural inter-
pretation of a generalization curve is as a likelihood func-
tion, a model of the probability of observing a novel mea-
surement xnovel, given that category S is present and having
observed x1, for example, . This functionP(x  SFx , S)novel 1
specifies the relationship between inputs and categories,
as proposed by Spence (1937), but by identifying it with
a statement about a probability (specifically, a likelihood)
rather than simply a strength. We can later invoke Bayes’s
rule to perform any required inference in more compli-
cated situations where there is ambiguity about the cause
of a given sensory signal.
It has been argued that under this probabilistic inter-
pretation, generalization curves should be approximately
exponential, decaying as a function of the distance from
the example (Shepard 1987; Tenenbaum and Griffiths
2001). Here we assume Gaussian generalization curves
from a single example because, first, this more closely
resembles Spence’s (1937) original suggestion, second, we
do not manipulate variables that would affect it (see
Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2001 for discussion on what var-
iables may affect this generalization curve), and third, us-
ing exponential curves would change none of the con-
clusions.
Two additional mechanisms are then required to model
behavioral generalization and discrimination: first, a map-
ping between the animal’s internal model and observed
pecking behavior, and second, a means to deal with mul-
tiple categories, some rewarded and others not. Bayesian
inference estimates the probability of a reward being as-
sociated with any given color, but what is observed is
pecking behavior. To allow comparison between the model
and behavior, we need to propose some relationship be-
tween these two quantities. The most natural relationship
is to assume that animals (approximately) obey Herrn-
stein’s (1961) matching rule. This rule states that the fre-
quency of selections is proportional to the estimated prob-
ability of reward. The matching rule generates suboptimal
behavior in an unchanging world but is (potentially) more
efficient in a changing world. Much experimental evidence
indicates that foraging animals obey the matching rule
(Kacelnik 1984; Stephens and Krebs 1986; Brito e Abreu
and Kacelnik 1999).
This leads to the second complication: dealing with mul-
tiple possible causes of the observed color. In our exper-
iments, rather than having only the single rewarded cat-
egory S, we conceptually have four categories. Two are
obvious, namely, trained-rewarded, S, and trained-
unrewarded, S. Two other conditions are also relevant:
the stimulus is neither S nor S but is associated with
reward nonetheless (S0), or the stimulus was neither S
nor S but is not associated with reward (S0). These four
conditions cover all possible situations: a stimulus was
either encountered before or not and is rewarded or not
rewarded. Given these four potential stimuli (S, S, S0,
and S0), we can generate a model of the pecking behavior
by assuming that the birds use the matching law to trans-
late between generalization curves (models of the condi-
tional probability of the novel stimulus, given a specific
category) and the category probability (and hence the
probability of reward). Bayes’s rule converts models of
probabilities that given colors belong to the four categories
to a model of the probability of reward. Bayes’s rule states
P(rewardFx )p P(reward)P(x Freward)/P(x ).novel novel novel
(2)
To take the terms on the right-hand side in order, P(re-
ward) is the relatively uninteresting stimulus-independent
term that represents the stimulus-independent chance of
reward. This value depends on overall motivation, and it
will affect only the total response rate. We therefore assume
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that, in our experimental condition, P(reward) is constant,
and we ignore it.
The second term, , is important. ThisP(x Freward)novel
specifies the probability of the novel stimulus, given that
there was a reward. In this study, there were only two ways
that a reward could occur, either as a result of the trained
stimulus S or as a result of another rewarded (but un-
known) category S0. Therefore, is theP(x Freward)novel
sum of these two probabilities, weighted by the prior prob-
ability of their occurrence:
P(x Freward)p P(x FS )P(S )novel novel  
 P(x FS0 )P(S0 ).novel  
In this equation, is the sum of ordinary (Gauss-P(x FS )novel 
ian) generalization curves centered on the known training
examples (fig. 1), and P(S) is the stimulus-independent
prior probability of the known rewarded stimulus occur-
ring determined by both its historical frequency of oc-
currence and the recency of previous stimulations. Stimuli
that have occurred often and recently are more likely to
occur again. Here is the generalization curveP(x FS0 )novel 
for all unknown but rewarded objects. Since it is unknown,
we can assume that all stimuli are equally likely to belong
to it, so this generalization curve is flat over the possible
range of stimuli. Finally, P(S0) is the probability of an
unknown but rewarded stimulus occurring.
However, in our experiment, there were no cases of
rewards not associated with S, so , and henceP(S0 )p 0
the form of is irrelevant. Here we have as-P(x FS0 )novel 
sumed that all rewarded stimuli are rewarded with 100%
probability. A full account of generalization would require
an additional level of inference, but this is not required
for the data here.
To summarize, the generalization from the positively
rewarded stimulus resembles that of Spence (1937). The
difference in the Bayesian account centers on how infor-
mation from the unrewarded stimuli is incorporated. In
Spence’s account, information from the unrewarded stim-
uli is treated as having a negative reward, and phenomena
such as peak shift occur because of the difference between
the generalization curves of rewarded and unrewarded
stimuli (fig. 1). In the Bayesian account, unrewarded stim-
uli influence generalization through the denominator of
equation (2) and operate in a divisive manner: in Spence’s
scheme, reinforcing the unrewarded color subtracts from
the probability of responding; in the Bayesian scheme, it
increases the P(xnovel) and hence scales the probability of
responding. As is clear from equation (2), calculation of
the probability of reward also requires the last term,
P(xnovel). Since our four events are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive, P(xnovel) can be calculated by summing all four
situations, weighted by their probability of occurrence:
P(x )p P(x FS )P(S ) P(x FS0 )P(S0 )novel novel   novel  
 P(x FS )P(S )novel  
 P(x FS0 )P(S0 ).novel  
It is this stage that represents the influence of unrewarded
stimuli on generalization. As can be seen from figure 7B
and equation (2), the probability of reward is decreased
divisively by . Increasing the probability of anP(x FS0 )novel 
unrewarded stimulus increases the denominator in equa-
tion (2), P(xnovel), while not increasing the numerator.
Probability theory states that the probabilities of an ex-
haustive set of possibilities have to sum to 1. This means
that if xnovel could potentially be the result of either a re-
warded stimulus or an unrewarded one, these two stimuli
compete to represent the stimulus, and therefore the prob-
ability of xnovel being the rewarded stimulus decreases. This
can be seen graphically in figure 7B. Of the four terms in
P(xnovel), the first two are simply the previously encoun-
tered reward-based terms. The third and fourth terms rep-
resent the probability that xnovel was a previously encoun-
tered unrewarded stimulus (with a Gaussian generalization
curve centered on the stimulus value) or a novel but un-
rewarded stimulus (with a flat generalization curve). The
term P(S0), the probability of the stimulus being un-
known and unrewarded, cannot be ignored, since because
of the way the experiment is conducted, the animals en-
counter previously rewarded stimuli that have now been
eaten and hence are unrewarded. The simplest way to
model this is a catchall unspecific, unrewarded category.
Implications of a Bayesian Account of the Peak Shift
As has been shown, interpreting the generalization curves
as likelihood functions leads to an extremely general Bayes-
ian account of peak shift. Before considering the actual
experiments, a few words are in order on the differences
between our account and that of Spence (1937) and related
models. First, in the latter accounts, the unrewarded stim-
ulus must be regarded as negatively rewarded, and its effect
is subtractive (fig. 1). This presents a minor difficulty in
specifying the perceived value of unrewarded stimuli. By
comparison, in a Bayesian account, the effects of the un-
rewarded stimuli are competitive and divisive. The effects
on generalization are well specified, being proportional to
the chance that the unrewarded stimulus caused the ob-
servation. Second, the theory predicts that manipulations
that affect the stimulus-independent probability of T and
T (such as biased presentation rates) will affect gener-
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Figure 7: Predictions of a Bayesian model of generalization. A, Need for adaptive generalization curves. The thin solid line shows a typical peak
shift that we would expect when animals are trained with rewards at 5 and not rewarded at 5. This curve was generated using the proposed
Bayesian model, but similar curves could be generated by models based on Spence’s (1937) principles. The thick solid line shows the generalization
expected if the unrewarded stimuli were not at 5 but at 0, a condition corresponding to our fine condition. As can be seen, if generalization
curves from the positive and negative examples have the same extent, then peak shift should increase. This is not what we found. If, instead, the
extent of generalization from an individual example is moderated by the nearest counterexample, the observed decrease of peak shift is predicted
(dashed line). B, Effects of time can change generalization curves. The thick solid line shows a generalization curve due to training on a positively
rewarded stimulus at 5 and an unrewarded stimulus at 5. If a long interval is inserted before testing, then the probabilities P and P will decay.
This will cause the changes in generalization shown by the thin solid line (a fivefold decay) and the dashed line (a further fivefold decay). C, Effects
of the relative frequency of the rewarded and unrewarded stimuli. One simple manipulation is to alter the relative number of rewarded and
unrewarded stimuli, and this plot shows the effect of this manipulation for one set of parameters. We illustrate effects of equal numbers of rewarded
and unrewarded stimuli (thick solid line), five times as many unrewarded as rewarded stimuli (dashed line), and five times as many rewarded as
unrewarded stimuli (thin solid line). The main effect is to shift the generalization curves.
alization, essentially shifting curves to the left and right.
Notice also that in this model, if only T stimuli are ever
presented, this will result in a flat generalization as a func-
tion of xnovel: even if a stimulus is very unlikely to have
been generated by the observed positively rewarded class,
given no evidence for a negatively rewarded class, it is still
more likely to have been generated by this class.
Finally, the effects of the two “unobserved” classes are
of interest. If P(S0), the chance that a stimulus was gen-
erated by an observed and unrewarded class, is 0, then
open-ended generalization will occur (see also Ghirlanda
and Enquist 1999, 2003). If, in contrast, P(S0) is large,
then the generalization will form a peak. In summary, peak
shift phenomena can be simply mapped to the mechanics
of Bayesian probabilistic inference. Doing so generates
many of the same predictions as Spence’s (1937) account,
but (1) the phenomenon is placed within the general
framework of probabilistic inference that is used to explain
many other aspects of perception and learning, (2) arbi-
trary parameters (such as the level of negative reward for
unrewarded stimuli) become principled, (3) a new family
of interpretable and principled parameters with specific
effect on generalization is produced, and (4) there is no
need to assume that performance is limited by neural
mechanisms beyond the receptors (Enquist and Arak 1993,
1998). These effects are shown in figure 7. We therefore
argue that this framework is worth developing as a basis
for understanding sensory generalization.
Variable Widths of Generalization Curves
Finally, we return to the key experimental observation
here, namely, the effect of separation of T and T. Are
generalization curves to single stimuli fixed or plastic and
perhaps determined by the inferred stimulus variability?
Models that use fixed generalization curves may not make
optimal use of available information, because fixed-width
curves disregard any information about the stimulus var-
iability. When making inferences about objects that show
great variability (the size of dogs or the color of apples),
common sense suggests that one may extrapolate or gen-
eralize from a single example over a larger range than when
one encounters an example from a category that shows
less variability (size of cats or the color of ripe oranges).
The practical advantages of taking account of stimulus
variability are well known in machine learning (Hastie et
al. 2001). A common and powerful technique for both
classification and density estimation are so-called kernel
methods. Conceptually, these methods resemble Spence’s
(1937) account in that a model of the data is constructed
by superimposing multiple generalization functions
(known in the literature as “kernels”). What is relevant
here is that these methods work well but only if the scale
of the generalization function is well matched to the data;
otherwise, performance can be poor. As is often the case,
the reason for this can be understood from the extreme
cases. If the generalization from a given example extended
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only infinitesimally, then there would essentially be no
generalization: all novel stimuli would be classed as dif-
ferent from all others. In the other case, if generalization
extended from a given example infinitely, all novel stimuli
would be classed as equally similar to a novel one. The
method usually used in machine learning to choose an
appropriate generalization curve width is cross validation
(the width is chosen by keeping some percentage of the
data back and testing how well a particular generalization
curve width allows prediction of these “unseen” data).
Cross validation in its simplest form is unrealistic as a
biological model. Despite this, because practical perfor-
mance for realistic problems has been found to be so highly
dependent on adapting the generalization widths to the
data, it is of interest to explore whether such a mechanism
is operating in color category learning.
Returning to the experimental results reported here, for
two stimuli separated by a distance x, the simple sum-
mation and normalization of the generalization curves pre-
dicts the observed peak shift. The critical manipulation is
when the distance between the two stimuli is increased or
decreased. For fixed generalization curves, there is only
one possible prediction: the stimulus of maximum re-
sponse gets shifted away from the negative response. This
contrasts with a system that adapts its generalization curves
to one stimulus in response to estimated stimulus vari-
ability. In the first situation, the peak shift is the same.
The differences are observed when one changes the dis-
tance between T and T. If the generalization from T
is affected by the inferred variability (estimated from the
range spanned by T and T) and scales with it in some
way, then decreasing the distance between T and T will
decrease the degree of generalization from T. Hence, we
can observe that decreasing the distance between T and
T can shift the peak associated with T toward T.
One simple way of understanding this effect is that the
range of stimuli scales the perceptual space. For this rea-
son, we call this effect a “perceptual ruler,” a concept that
can be understood independent of the underlying algo-
rithm. Our data suggest that such an effect is used by
chicks to help them take advantage of information about
stimulus variability.
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APPENDIX
The Bayesian Model
The body of the article describes a Bayesian model, and the predictions of this model are shown in figure 7 for a
number of different situations. Although it possible to reconstruct the model from text, this appendix contains an
explicit description of the model and gives the parameters that were used to generate the three panels of figure 7.
The goal is to make a prediction of the probability of reward as a function of the stimulus value, for example,
. Assuming , this results in the following equations:P(rewardFx ) P(reward)p constantnovel
P(rewardFx )p P(x Freward)P(reward)/P(x ), (Bayes’s rule),novel novel novel
P(x Freward)p P(x FS )P(S ) P(x FS0 )P(S0 ),novel novel   novel  
P(x )p P(x FS )P(S ) P(x FS0 )P(S0 ) P(x FS )P(S ) P(x FS0 )P(S0 ).novel novel   novel   novel   novel  
Assuming Gaussian-shaped generalization functions around both the positively and negatively rewarded stimuli, we
have
2 2P(x FS )p exp [(x  loc_positive) /(2# width )]novel  novel
and
2 2P(x FS )p exp [(x  loc_negative) /(2# width )],novel  novel
where in figure 7 the positive stimuli were always were located at 5 (i.e., ) and the negative stimuliloc_positivep 5
had values of 5 or 0, as indicated in the text ( or 0).loc_negativep 5
The two unobserved stimuli classes have an even simpler form:
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P(x FS0 )p 1,novel 
P(x FS0 )p 1.novel 
This leaves the four prior probability parameters, P(S), P(S0), P(S), and P(S0), together the width of the gen-
eralization curve.
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